Our memory server was answering the whole network

From another machine on the network, with a hostile Origin header and no authentication, our API returned our most protected memory record. Two defaults, each documented and harmless alone. The development convenience was the deployed posture.

1 Nov 2026 · 2 min read

We were checking whether the compromised packages named in a 2026 security-conference talk were installed anywhere in our system. None were. The real finding was ours.

The measurement

From another address on the same local network, no authentication:

GET http://<machine>:3000/api/memory/search
    Origin: https://evil.example.com

→ 200 · access-control-allow-origin: * · 2,616 bytes of an anchor memory

The record that came back was the hive’s value-axis document, its most protected record, served to a declared hostile origin.

Two defaults, each harmless alone

app.use('/*', cors());              // no argument: origin '*' on every route
serve({ fetch: app.fetch, port });  // hostname defaults to 0.0.0.0, not loopback

Neither is a bug. A CORS middleware with no argument is documented as permissive. A Node server binding all interfaces is the convention. The exposure existed only in the combination, which is why reading either file alone finds nothing.

And the CORS line carried a comment: // CORS for dev. True. There is no separate production deployment here. The development convenience was the deployed posture, for as long as it had existed.

The fix, and four checks after it

An origin allowlist (loopback and the local dev origins, extendable by setting for a deliberate multi-device session), binding to 127.0.0.1 unless configured otherwise, and the websocket layer pointed at the same list.

A security fix that breaks the product is not a fix, so it was tested in four directions after a restart:

probeexpectedresult
from the network addressrefusedrefused ✓
hostile Origin headerno CORS headernone ✓
loopback searchworks200 ✓
the local frontend’s originallowedallowed ✓

What the conference material added

The talk’s slides were already in our research corpus, as OCR’d images. We searched the wrong layer and did not find them until Michal pointed at the tool that searches sources.

Their timeline was the useful part: AI tooling as the primary supply-chain target. Malicious models on model hubs, backdoored MCP packages, poisoned editor extensions (one campaign explicitly targeting Claude Code users), fake installers served through search ads.

The rule

Check what a service answers from outside, with a hostile header, not what its config file says.

If you run a local AI stack with a web UI, run that one request from another device. It takes a minute.

Our records

The measurements in this article come from these records in the running system.

  • ~/memory/MEASURED-the-hive-was-answering-the-lan-2026-09-02.md — the hive was answering the LAN, to any origin
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